Private Suits Against States in the Federal Courts
State immunity from private suit in the federal courts is a facet of
sovereign immunity, that confused and often criticized doctrine which
has steadily been weakened by legislative and judicial attack. Unlike
federal immunity, or state immunity in state courts, state immunity
in federal courts is based at least in part on the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution. For this reason it has eroded more slowly than
the other varieties. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
utilized the concept of implied consent to defeat this immunity under
certain circumstances. Although the Court earlier had expanded the
state's immunity from suit in federal courts beyond the literal scope
of the eleventh amendment, recently it has restricted this immunity
by imposing a dubious distinction permitting suits based on congressionally created causes of action. This comment examines the implications of this development for traditional state immunity.
I.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND THE

Hans

DOCTRINE

The concept of sovereign immunity-that the king could not be
sued in his own courts without his consent-early became part of this
country's legal system along with other elements of the common law. 1
However, since this country rejected both the concept of divine right
and the institution of monarchy, courts and commentators have been
hard-pressed to justify immunity,2 and often rely on the inability to
1 An ancient maxim is generally thought to describe best the conceptual origins of
sovereign immunity: "The King can do no wrong." See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). The prohibition was not
absolute, however, as relief could be obtained under the common law by a system of
petitions. Furthermore, a clear distinction was drawn between suits against the sovereign
and suits against officers or agents of the Crown, with different methods and degrees of
consent available under the different suits. See generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments
and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2-19 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214-16, 359 P.2d 457,
459-60, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 91-92 (1961); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE
L.J. 1 passim (1924); Jaffe, supra note 1, at 19-21. Since monarchy was rejected, the
petition of right available in England was never available in America. See id. at 19.
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administer the laws effectively which would supposedly result from
permitting suits against the government without severe limitation.3 A
more satisfactory explanation is that many state and local governments
fear the depletion of public treasuries.4 In any event, the general
immunity doctrine has been gradually limited by the courts and
legislatures 5 and retains only vestiges of its former force except in
suits by individuals against a state in a federal court.6 The vitality of
this exception is largely attributable to its constitutional basis.
In 1793 two South Carolina citizens brought an original action in
the Supreme Court as executors to collect a debt owed the estate by
Georgia. The state refused to appear, denying jurisdiction. The Court
in Chisholm v. Georgia7 held that its jurisdiction extended to a suit
brought against a state by citizens of another state.8 There ensued a
3 See, e.g., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868) (Field, J.). Mr. Justice Holmes,
in Kawananhoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907), offered a theoretical justification by
stating that "there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends." Id. at 353. This is too broad to be satisfactory since it does
not explain the existence of legal rights against the sovereign when it consents to suit,
intervenes, or is subject to counterclaim.
4 See, e.g., 1 WaREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HiSToRY 91-102 (1922).
5 See, e.g., Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316
P.2d 582 (1957); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 111. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). Mr. Justice
Traynor has written: "Only the vestigial remains of such governmental immunity have
survived; its requiem has long been foreshadowed. For years the process of erosion of
governmental immunity has gone on unabated. The Legislature has contributed mightily
to that erosion. The courts, by distinction and exten'sion, have removed much of the
force of the rule." Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 221, 359 P.2d 457,
463, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 95 (1961).
Legislative restriction of immunity usually takes one of two forms. Some state legislatures specify types of agencies which can be sued or types of causes of action which shall
be allowed. See, e.g., LA. CONsT. art. III, § 35. Others extend immunity by statute to a
small number of state organizations, allowing the courts to conclude that no other organization is immune. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 439 (1965). The Federal Tort Claims
Act has substantially limited federal immunity, subject -to certain exceptions dealing with
discretionary action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 2671-78, 2680 (1964).
6 Suits against states in state courts and suits against the United States are so
frequently allowed by actual consent or by resort to suits against officers that the plea of
immunity is seldom invoked. See generally Borchard, supra note 2; Jaffe, supra note 1.
In suits against states in federal courts, however, pleas of immunity are heard more
frequently and succeed more consistently. See, e.g., Great No. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47 (1944); Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
7 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
8 It was argued on behalf of Georgia that article III, § 2 of the Constitution only
contemplated suits in which states were plaintiffs, since the concept of a "sovereign" state's
being sued without its consent was so foreign to the common law that it could have
played no part in the framing of the Constitution. However, the majority of the Court
was convinced that the plain -meaning of the Constitution invested federal courts with
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violent reaction among the bar and the general public,9 resulting in
the prompt adoption and ratification of the eleventh amendment,
which effectively reversed Chisholm. The amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.'0
Although some subsequent Supreme Court decisions have expanded
and others have limited the scope of the eleventh amendment,". the
basic principle remains intact: suits are prohibited when brought
against a state by the citizens of another state.'12 An attempt to take
jurisdiction over the action. Because each Justice entered a separate opinion, with only Mr.
Justice Iredell dissenting, it is difficult to define the reasoning behind the Court's decision.
) See COMWIN, THE CONSTITUTION 238 (1954); LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISNX AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CrANGE 202 (1956); 1 WAREN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 96-101. Much of this consternation
was undoubtedly due to the fact that the foremost proponents of the Constitution had, in
preratification days, expressly denied that article III, § 2, which provided that "the
judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between a State and Citizens of
another State," would have the effect the Court gave it in Chisholm. See id. at 96.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment refers neither to sovereignty nor to immunity,
but involves both. It is phrased in terms of federal court jurisdiction and deals with the
allocation between the federal government and the states of judicial power to decide
certain cases. The underlying considerations are therefore those of federalism. However,
the amendment indirectly involves immunity. Although there may be a technical difference between contesting a suit on the basis of an alleged lack of jurisdiction and entering
a plea of sovereign immunity, the effect is the same: a federal court may not enter a
judgment against the state in either case. Furthermore, the language of the amendment,
literally read, suggests problems of subject matter jurisdiction which do not arise in practice. Although it is basic that parties may not waive defects in subject -matter jurisdiction,
the ability of the state to waive the protection of the eleventh amendment has never been
seriously contested. Either the question is one of the identity of parties rather than subject
matter, or the rule prohibiting waiver of defects in subject matter jurisdiction has been
ignored in favor of the historic ability of the state to waive its immunity. In any case, the
power to waive immunity is well established. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
13 See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (suits by foreign
countries as well as by their citizens barred); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892)
(no immunity where suit is brought by United States); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887)
(state need not be the party of record to be immune; suit against an officer); Clark v.
Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (state can waive by voluntary submission to suit); New
Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (immunity valid where plaintiff state acts
merely as agent for the collection of its citizens' debts). A major development in this
area, made without reference to the eleventh amendment, was the permission of suits to
restrain state officers from acting ultra vires or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.
The officer is deemed to be stripped of his official capacity and to be acting individually.
E.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Such actions may be mandatory as well as
prohibitory, but monetary damages are not recoverable. See generally Davis, Suing the
Government by Falsely Pretending To Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1962).
1.2 See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886);
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). Cf. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S.
711 (1882).
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advantage of the failure of the amendment expressly to prohibit suits
by citizens of the same state was made in Hans v. Louisiana.18 The
plaintiff, a Louisiana citizen, held $87,500 in coupons annexed to
bonds issued by Louisiana, which later repudiated its obligations under
the bonds. 14 The plaintiff sued in a federal court and invoked the
court's federal question jurisdiction by alleging that the state's revocation of its obligations violated article I, section 10 of the Constitution, 15 which prohibits a state from passing any law impairing the
obligation of contracts. The suit was dismissed for want of jurisdic16
tion,
the Supreme Court affirmed.
Hansand
clearly held that federal courts do not have jurisdiction
over
a suit against an unconsenting state brought by its own citizen even
when the case arises under the Constitution or laws of the United
States. The basis for the decision, however, is unclear. Mr. Justice
Bradley, writing for the majority, discussed at length the background
of the eleventh amendment and implied that it prohibits such suits
in spirit, even though not expressly. 17 There was also a strong implication, however, that the state's immunity in this case was "inherent
in the nature of sovereignty"' and would be sustained even without
the eleventh amendment. The opinion does not make clear whether
the holding of Hans was intended as a judicial expansion of the
eleventh amendment, as a commentary on article III, section 2 of the
Constitution read in the light of the eleventh amendment, 19 or as a
definitive statement of the common law of sovereign immunity.
The question is important. If the immunity is based on the common law it may be directly limited or even abrogated by judicial
decision. If the immunity is constitutional, however, judicial efforts
to limit its application must be much more cautious. The best view
would seem to be that the immunity provided by Hans is based on
the common law. The eleventh amendment clarifies article III, section
13 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
14 Id. at 2.

15 Id. at 3.
16 24 Fed. 55 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885).
17 "Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts,
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly
repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had appended
to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being sued by
its own citizens in cases arising under the Coristitution or laws of the United States: can
we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would
is almost an absurdity on its face." 134 U.S. at 15.
18 Id. at 13.
19 "The truth is, that the cognizance of suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the
judicial power of the United States." Id. at 15.
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2 of the Constitution by providing that federal judicial power "shall
not be construed to extend" to two types of suits. That a third type--!
a citizen suing his own state-was not mentioned does not, of course,
require the conclusion that such an action is approved. Prior to Chisholm v. Georgia it was assumed that the new federal court system
did not alter traditional common law applications of sovereign immunity. 20 When that case reached a contrary result as to citizens of
another state, the immunity was made explicit by a constitutional
amendment. On the other hand, suits by citizens against their own
state or sovereign were familiar at common law, and immunity was
the rule. Immunity was so much taken for granted that the possibility
that states could be sued in the newly created federal forum was probably not considered at all. This conclusion is supported by the fact
that federal courts at that time did not possess general federal question
jurisdiction. 21 Thus, Hans can best be explained as based either implicitly or explicitly on the states' common law immunity.
Federal case law subsequent to Hans has not attempted to clarify the
source of the immunity. Nearly all of the cases which have relied on
Hans have tended to regard it as a part of the eleventh amendment
and thus constitutional in nature.2 The Hans doctrine has consistently
been enforced in a wide range of cases involving federal questions,
See, e.g., id. at 11-18.
Not until 1875 was general federal question jurisdiction extended to the federal
courts. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470. Thus, the problems of concurrent
jurisdiction were fewer.
22 "[W]e must give to the Eleventh Amendment all the effect it naturally would have,
without cutting it down or rendering its meaning any more narrow than the language,
fairly interpreted, would warrant. It applies to a suit brought against a State by one of its
own citizens as well as to a suit brought by a citizen of another state. Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908). Similarly broad statements are
frequent. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 591
(1904); Scott v. Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1964); Skokomish Indian
Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555, 560 (9th Cir. 1959); Union Trust Co. v. Steams, 119 Fed.
790, 791 (C.C.D.R.I. 1903); Smith v. Rackliffe, 87 Fed. 964, 968 (9th Cir. 1898); DeLong Corp.
v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7, 17 (D. Ore. 1964), af'd, 343 F.2d 911
(9th Cir. 1965); Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubenstein, 133 F. Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
But see McCartney v. West Virginia, 156 F.2d 739, 740 (4th Cir. 1946), in which the court
stated: "This immunity, at least with respect to actions brought by citizens of the state
sued, does not arise from the restriction of the l1th Amendment .... Rather, it comes
from what Hamilton described in the Federalist as the 'inherent ... nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.' This rule was laid
down in unmistakable terms in Hans v. Louisiana .. " See also Judge Brown's concurring
opinion in Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 311 F.2d 727, 734 (5th Cir.
1963): "Sovereign immunity, threadbare as it generally is, is recognized in law. It may, as it
does here, deny effectual enforcement to a clear legal right. But that does not raise this
notion to the stature of a federal constitutional right."
20

21
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most of them constitutional rather than statutory.2 Its force has been
equal to that of the express prohibition of the eleventh amendment
against suits by citizens of another state or country in the federal courts.
II.

WAIVER OF IMMUNITY-THE INTRODUCTION OF
IMPLIED CONSENT

The traditional judicial approach to the question of waiver of immunity or consent by a state to suit has taken several forms, but all
forms share a common purpose: the protection of the state's ability
to grant or withhold consent entirely at its pleasure. The following
rules of construction are used to accomplish this purpose. A finding
of consent to suit "could only be warranted if exacted by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text
24
as would leave no room for any other reasonable construction."
Whether such a statement or implication exists must be determined
25
by the law of the particular state. The consent or waiver must apprivilege. 26
proximate a voluntary abandonment of a known right or
A statute will not be construed to limit any of the sovereign's preexist27
Moreing rights or privileges without express language to that effect.
over, even if a state has consented generally to be sued,28it has not
necessarily consented thereby to be sued in a federal court.
The Supreme Court has recently made substantial changes in this
field, and these rules no longer have unqualified application. The pro23 The Hans doctrine has been extended to a wide range of situations. See Ex parte
New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (admiralty); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920)
(action to enjoin the enforcement of the eighteenth amendment); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S.
436 (1900) (action to recover taxes); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899) (suit alleging
deprivation of property without due process); North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22
(1890) (seeking affirmative relief from a special tax); Scott v. Board of Supervisors of
La. State University, 336 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1964) (tort); Skokomish Indian Tribe v.
France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959) (suit alleging deprivation of property in violation of
treaty); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore. 1964),
aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965) (action for declaration of rights and obligations under
a contract). The only escape from Hans, as from the eleventh amendment, lay in suing an
officer under the appropriate fictions of such suits. See note 11 supra.
24 Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909); cf. Chandler v. Dix, 194
U.S. 590 (1904).
25 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 454 (1945).
24 This concept is imported from habeas corpus cases such as Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which are frequently cited as upholding the proposition that such a rule of construction is applicable in sovereign immunity cases. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S.
184, 200 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
27 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 272 (1947); United States v. Herron, 87 U.S. (20

Wall.) 251, 255 (1873).
28 See, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 172 (1909).
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logue to this change was Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n.29
The plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, sued in the federal district
court under the Jones Act to recover compensation for the death of
her husband, who had died while working aboard one of the defendant's ferry boats. The defendant was a bi-state agency created by
an interstate compact between Tennessee and Missouri and approved
by Congress pursuant to article I, section 10 of the Constitution. The
compact provided that the commission would build a bridge over
and operate ferries at given points across the Mississippi River. The
commission was given power "to contract, to sue and be sued in its
own name." 30 Congress, in approving the compact, attached a proviso
that the terms of the compact would not be construed "to affect, impair, or diminish any right, power or jurisdiction of ... any court...
of the United States, over or in regard to any navigable waters, or any
commerce between the States ...."-31The lower court's dismissal of the
suit for lack of jurisdiction 32 was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The fact that there would have been no waiver of immunity under
either Missouri or Tennessee law33 did not deter the Court in Petty
any more than did the well-established proposition that sue-and-besued clauses are construed as giving consent to suit in state, not federal,
courts. 3 4 The Court found that since the "waiver" was contained in
an interstate compact its interpretation was a matter of federal law.35
The Court interpreted the congressional proviso as a deliberate reservation of jurisdiction and hinted that action by the states under the
compact after it had been approved with such a reservation was important in determining that the states had consented to suit.30 Congress "approved a sue-and-be-sued clause in a compact under conditions
that make it clear that the States accepting it waived any immunity
37
from suit which they otherwise might have."
29 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
30 Id. at 277.
31 Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n Compact, ch. 758, 63 Stat. 930 (1949).
32 The Eighth Circuit, in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the suit for lack of
jurisdiction, held (1) that the defendant was an instrumentality of both Tennessee and
Missouri, not a separate entity, (2) that neither state, expressly or by its courts' interpretations of "sue-and-be-sued" clauses, had consented to suit in tort, and (3) that by virtue
of the eleventh amendment the plaintiff could not sue Missouri in a federal court, nor
could she sue Tennessee by virtue of Hans v. Louisiana. Petty v. Tennessee-Mo.
Bridge Comm'n, 254 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1958).
33 359 U.S. at 279.
34 See, e.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
35 359 U.S. at 280.
36 359 U.S. at 280-81.
37 Id. at 280. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whom Justices Harlan and Whittaker joined in
dissenting, was not persuaded by the congressional proviso since, as he pointed out, it was
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The Petty decision represents a departure from the traditional approach to state consent described above both in its application of
federal law to the issue of consent and in its suggestion that state action
in a field over which Congress has reserved jurisdiction might weigh
heavily in the finding of consent. Cases involving such factors as sueand-be-sued clauses and interstate compacts are rare, however, and it
was possible in Petty to point to specific language, known and acted
upon by the states, which indicated waiver. 38 These same contentions
could not be made in Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks
Dep't.39

The petitioners in Parden,citizens of Alabama, sued the respondent
state-owned railway in the federal district court in Alabama seeking
damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained while employed by the railway. It was not disputed that the
railway was a common carrier for hire in interstate commerce, that it
was operated for profit pursuant to Alabama statutes, and that it was
wholly owned and operated by the State of Alabama through its State
Docks Department. No facts concerning the injuries were disputed.
Alabama appeared specially in the district court and moved to quash
the summons on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction since
Alabama had not waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.
The motion was granted and the court of appeals affirmed, 40 but the
Supreme Court reversed and held that the state's operation of a coma standard insertion in approval of such compacts and was not, as legislative history
showed, aimed at overcoming immunity from suit. Id. at 285-89.
38 Subsequent federal question cases have been distinguished from Petty on the grounds
that they involved no sue-and-be-sued clause in an interstate compact. See Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1959) (quiet title suit involving the construction of treaty between United States and Indian tribe; waiver of state's immunity determined by state law); DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n, 233 F. Supp. 7 (D.
Ore. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965) (declaratory judgment action to interpret
contract for construction of interstate bridge; waiver of state's immunity determined by
state law). See also J. Ray McDermott & Co. v. Department of Highways, State of La.,
267 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959) (federal admiralty jurisdiction; waiver of state immunity
determined by state law); Gross v. Washington State Ferries, 59 Wash. 2d 241, 367 P.2d 600
(1961) (action based on Jones Act and general maritime law; waiver of state immunity
determined by state law).
Petty, of course, has not been used to find waiver by federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction. See Southern Ry. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 246 F. Supp. 435
(E.D.S.C. 1965); Zeidner v. Wulfrost, 197 F. Supp. 23 (E.D.N.Y. 1961); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
State Rds. Comm'n of Md., 187 F. Supp. 766, 771 (D. Md. 1960). Nor has Petty
been used to avoid state immunity in federal admiralty court suits under state created
causes of action. In re Nueces County, Texas, Road Dist. No. 4, 174 F. Supp. 846, 856
(S.D. Tex. 1959).
39 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
40 311 F.2d 727 (5th Cir. 1963).
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mon carrier railroad in interstate commerce constituted waiver of its
sovereign immunity and consent to suits brought by its employees in
the federal courts under the FELA.
The situation in Parden presented no possibility of informed and
deliberate consent, for Alabama's constitution, unlike those of most
other states, prohibits the state's being made a defendant in any court of
law or equity.41 The Alabama Supreme Court has consistently held that

neither the state legislature nor any state officer can waive the state's
42
immunity or consent to suit.

Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for a bare majority, conceded that
Alabama was protected by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suit without its consent, but concluded that Alabama had consented
to this suit. 43 The issues were posed as follows: "(1) Did Congress in

enacting the FELA intend to subject a State to suit in these circumstances? (2) Did it have the power to do so, as against the State's claim
of immunity?" 44 Both questions were answered in the affirmative.
The Court first noted that it had previously held both the Federal
Safety Appliance Act45 and the Railway Labor Act46 applicable to
state-owned railroads. Those decisions did not involve immunity, however, since neither act is enforceable by private suit. The Court then
pointed out that the language of the FELA is at least as broad as that
of the Federal Safety Appliance Act and the Railway Labor Act.4 7 The
Court argued that "to read a 'sovereign immunity exception' into the
Act would result ...

in a right without a remedy" 48 for one class of

ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14.
See, e.g., State Tax Comm'n v. Commercial Realty Co., 236 Ala. 358, 361, 182 So. 31,
35 (1938); Dunn Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 372, 376, 175 So. 383, 386
(1937).
43 377 U.S. at 186, 192-93.
44 Id. at 187.
45 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
46 California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957).
47 377 U.S. at 189. The relevant section of the FELA provides: "Every common carrier
by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories
. . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by
such carrier in such commerce . . . ." 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964).
The Court in Parden pointed out that the decision in California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553 (1957), was based in part on three lower court decisions holding "that the FELA did
authorize suit against a publicly owned railroad despite a claim of sovereign immunity."
377 U.S. at 189. The only one of these three suits which was in a federal court involved
a claim of immunity based on state law involving municipalities, not on Hans or the
eleventh amendment. Mathews v. Port Util. Comm'n, 32 F.2d 913 (E.D.S.C. 1929). The
other two cases were in state courts and could not have involved the type of immunity
claimed in Parden. Maurice v. State, 43 Cal. App. 2d 270, 110 P.2d 706 (Dist. Ct. App.
1941); Higginbotham v. Public Belt R.R. Comm'n, 192 La. 525, 188 So. 395 (1938).
48 377 U.S. at 190.
41

42
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employees since it would mean finding that Congress had made every
interstate railroad liable to its injured employees but left those whose
employers happened to be state owned without a guaranteed forum in
which to enforce such liability. "We are unwilling to conclude that
'49
Congress intended so pointless and frustrating a result.
Alabama claimed immunity under the Hans doctrine, arguing that
it was a constitutional rule which could not be changed by Congress
in the FELA. 50 A finding that the Hans doctrine was a matter of common law would have refuted this contention, since Congress has power
to change the common law by legislation. However, the Court, probably anticipating future cases, did not make such a declaration but
rather argued from both points of view.
Assuming that Alabama's immunity was based on common law, the
Court first reasoned that while a state may not be sued by an individual
without its consent.
By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States
empowered Congress to create such a right of action against
interstate railroads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of
this power, Congress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate commerce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the Act; by thereafter operating a
railroad in interstate commerce, Alabama must be taken to
have accepted that condition and thus to have consented to
suit. 5 '
The Court's argument concerning the surrender of sovereignty by
the ratification of the commerce clause 52 is superficially compelling but

presents problems of consistency; if it could succeed in Parden it
should have succeeded in Hans v. Louisiana.53 It cannot be argued
49 Ibid. There are two ways to approach the question of congressional intent in Parden.
Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that a class of potential defendants was named and that
no exceptions were made. From this fact he reasoned that Congress intended to include
states in that class. Mr. Justice White, dissenting, maintained that settled rules of
construction compelled the conclusion that states were not included since they were
not mentioned. It appears that no state was operating a common carrier railroad when
the FELA was enacted, and it is therefore impossible to determine whether Congress
contemplated potential state liability at all.
50 Brief for Respondents, pp. 12-13.
51 377 U.S. at 192.
52 Some might find it difficult to agree that an eleventh amendment right was waived
by ratifying the commerce clause since the eleventh amendment was promulgated
in 1798, several years after the commerce clause had become the supreme law of the
land. 1 WARREN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 101. The Supreme Court apparently found this
fact unpersuasive, as it was not mentioned in the opinion.
53 The same argument was advanced, without notable success, by the plaintiff in that
case.
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that ratification of the prohibition of laws impairing contractual obligations, a constitutional provision expressly taking a right away from
a state, involves any less a surrender of sovereignty than ratification
of the commerce clause, a constitutional provision which may make
necessary the removal of a right in the future. Furthermore, by subsequently issuing bonds, the state in Hans could be said to have "consented" to suit. Similar arguments could be advanced in favor of the
many plaintiffs who have been unable to recover because of the Hans
doctrine. 54
The Court in Parden distinguished Hans with an ease more apparent
than real. The plaintiff in Hans, it was said, had invoked the federal
question jurisdiction of the Court. In Parden, "for the first time in this
Court, a State's claim of immunity against suit by an individual meets
a suit brought upon a cause of action expressly created by Congress." 55
This, of course, is also a matter of federal question jurisdiction. The
Court distinguished three cases which had followed Hans by asserting
that they were "also commonplace suits in which the federal question
did not itself give rise to the alleged cause of action against the state
but merely lurked in the background."5 6 Thus, the Court created a
distinction between causes of action created by congressionally enacted
statutes and those involving other federal questions-such as basic constitutional issues-and thereby evaded Hans v. Louisiana.
The Court's second line of argument proceeded on the assumption
that Alabama's immunity was constitutional. The state argued that
since Congress could not remove its constitutional immunity directly,
it could not do so indirectly by conditioning the extension of the
privilege of entry into interstate commerce upon Alabama's waiver
of its sovereign immunity. 57 In support of this argument, an application of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions,"58 Alabama re54 See cases cited note 23 supra.
55 377 U.S. at 187.
56 Id. at 187 n.3. These cases were: Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921);
Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). Duhne v.
New Jersey was accurately described by the Court as "a suit against the State to restrain it
from enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, on the ground
that the Amendment was invalid." 377 U.S. at 187 n.3. From this description it is apparent
that the federal cause of action was not lurking in the background.
57 Brief for Respondents, pp. 14-16.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 571 (1898); Interstate
Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894); Monongahela Nay. Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893). A lengthy examination of the doctrine is not
within the scope of this comment. For extensive analyses of the case law see Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLum. L. REv. 321 (1935);
Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. Rav. 879 (1929); Willcox, Invasions of
the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955);
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lied on cases stating categorically that a legislative body cannot condition the grant of a privilege upon waiver of constitutional rights, even
if the privilege could be withheld entirely.59 An examination of the
cases in this field suggests, however, that such preconditioning is a
legitimate exercise of legislative authority as long as the condition
imposed is a necessary and reasonable method of regulating the area
in which the privilege is granted. 60 This relationship clearly exists in
Parden; the regulation of interstate commerce can reasonably be said
to require enforceable rights of action for all workers protected by the
FELA. Adopting this view, the Court in Parden dismissed each of
Alabama's authorities as "clearly distinguishable because the condition
sought to be imposed was deemed by the Court to fall outside the
scope of valid regulation."'61
The Court's basic argument, that Congress legitimately conditioned
entry into commerce on waiver of immunity and that the state's subsequent action served to waive immunity, is similar whether the basis
of immunity is seen as a matter of constitutional or common law. The
difference lies in the circumstances under which Congress can set
conditions. In Pardenit was only necessary to decide that Hans v. Louisiana should be overruled to the extent that it restricted Congress'
legitimate conditioning powers, a result most easily reached by a de62
termination that the Hans immunity was based on common law.
However, the Court, by basing its decision on the alternative common
law and constitutional law grounds, laid the logical groundwork for
finding a waiver of immunity whether the claim of immunity is based
on common law sovereign immunity or on the express language of the
eleventh amendment. The obvious implication of Pardenis that a similar result would have been reached if the plaintiff had been a citizen of
another state and if the defendant's immunity had thus been based
irrefutably on the eleventh amendment.
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAv. L. Rxv. 1595 (1960); Note, Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights Through Expansion of the Conditioned
Privilege Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J. 520 (1953). For an excellent criticism of the logical
fallacies inherent in both sides of the argument see French, Unconstitutional Conditions:
An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234 (1961).
59 See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949); Hanover Fire
Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926); Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926). Cf. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
60 That the Court is moving toward this standard with increasing consistency is
suggested by, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); United
States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251
(1932); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Conm'n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651 (1927).
61 377 U.S. at 193-94 n.11.
62 See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
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Where federal jurisdiction is based upon a federal question 3 it
would seem that the reasoning in Parden can be logically extended to
overrule sub silentio all of Hans and to negate the eleventh amendment.64 It would be possible to find a prior general waiver by the states
in ratifying the Constitution and in subsequent specific action such
as the issuance of bonds or operation of an interstate railroad. However, the Court attempted to avoid this extreme and to distinguish Hans
by interposing as a third precondition to the finding of waiver congressional legislation which could be said to create a federal cause of
action.
The future significance of Parden is difficult to predict despite the
fact that mechanically the distinction between congressionally created
causes of action and other federal questions is unlikely to pose troublesome problems. Since a congressionally created cause of action must
involve an area of federal regulation, any liability imposed upon a
state must be preceded by the state's entry into the field. Such an entry
will necessarily involve some action which a federal court will be able
to treat as a waiver of immunity. But the technical feasibility of the
distinction does not justify it; there seems to be no reason why state
immunity should prevent a suit on a federal question and yet be ineffective against a suit based on a congressionally created cause of action.
That the federal courts should be open to a suit under the FELA but
closed to a plaintiff whose constitutional rights have been violated is an
unavoidable result of the Pardendecision, but is so anomalous 65 that it
63 The area involving federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship is not
overruled by Parden. In such cases there is no prior general waiver by the states, as can
be said to exist in federal question jurisdiction based on causes of action arising under
the Constitution and laws of the United States. Furthermore, under the Erie doctrine,
waiver in diversity cases would be a matter of state and not of federal law. See Scott v.
Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1964) (rejecting Parden in diversity
action); Southern Ry. v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 246 F. Supp. 435 (E.DS.C.
1965) (Parden not cited in diversity case).
Parden was also distinguished in a federal question case which did not involve a
congressionally created cause of action. DeLong Corp. v. Oregon State Highway Comm'n,
233 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ore. 1964), afj'd, 343 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1965) (declaratory judgment
for interpretation of contract to construct an interstate bridge; waiver of state immunity
determined by state law).
64 For example, the Court's opinion explicitly linked Hans with the eleventh amendment on several occasions and employed language so broad as to encompass a suit against a
state by a citizen of another state: "A State's immunity from suit by an individual
without its consent has been fully recognized by the Eleventh Amendment and by subsequent decisions of this Court. But when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its
own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to
that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation." 377 U.S. at 196.
65 Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing for a unanimous Court in Lynch v. United States, could
perceive no such distinction: "The sovereign's immunity from suit exists whatever the
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may not be tolerated by the courts. Once the distinction is rejected, the
central constitutional question must be squarely faced.
The reasoning of the Parden decision seems to apply to all constitutionally enacted federal statutes which create private causes of action.
Despite this apparent breadth, the number of congressionally created
causes of action 6 entitled to the benefit of Parden's reasoning may be
relatively small, since some statutes exempt states from coverage G7 and
some only authorize actions brought by the United States or one of its
agencies.68 There are several existing causes of action, however, to which
Parden could apply. Because the Jones Act specifically adopts FELA
provisions, the Parden analysis is clearly applicable.6 9 The implied
consent rationale is also relevant to the private action for treble damages
under federal anti-trust laws when a state is the defendant.70 The application of implied consent to state immunity need not be confined to
areas under Congress' commerce power; Parden does not compel such a
limitation. For example, federal patent statutes create private causes of
action, 71 which could be brought against a state, perhaps under respondeat superior in connection with the activities of its agents. The patentee could argue persuasively on the strength of Pardenthat a state, in
ratifying article I, section 8 of the Constitution, surrendered any portion
of its sovereignty which would interfere with congressional regulation
pursuant to that provision; and that Congress preconditioned state action 72 in the regulated field upon amenability to suit in the federal
character of the proceeding or the source of the right sought to be enforced. It applies
alike to causes of action arising under acts of Congress ... and to those arising from some
violation of rights conferred upon the citizen by the Constitution." 292 U.S. 559, 582 (1934).
66 This term should not be taken too literally. The FELA cause of action "expressly
created by Congress," which was involved in Parden, can justifiably be viewed not as an
entirely new cause of action but as a significant modification of an already existing
common law right of action. The dissent in Parden viewed it as such. 377 U.S. at 199.
A cause of action would seem to meet the requirements of Parden if it is either wholly
new or represents a substantial departure from an already existing common law action.
67 For example, two sections of the Taft-Hartley Act exempt states from the coverage of
that act. See 61 Stat. 137, 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 142, 152(2) (1964). The same effect is
achieved by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, which precludes compensation under the act for an officer or employee of any state. See 44 Stat.
1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(2) (1964).
68 For example, the provisions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act create a right of
action in the Interstate Commerce Commission and do not authorize private suits. See
29 Stat. 85 (1896), 45 U.S.C. § 6 (1964).
69 See 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
70 The Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained .... 38
3 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
71 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281 (1964).
72 The plaintiff's major difficulty in such an action would be to isolate some act of the
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courts, regardless of the basis of the immunity.73 A similar argument
could be made in a copyright infringement action.7 4 Thus, it is apparent that the periphery of the Parden rule may be the subject of some
uncertainty.
CONCLUSION

In Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n and Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dep't the Supreme Court adopted a
new approach to the problem of state immunity from suit in federal
courts. The curiously limited nature of the holding in Parden is probably the result of a compromise between the Supreme Court's distaste
for the results of the sovereign immunity doctrine and its hesitancy to
contravene the eleventh amendment. It is clear, however, that if Parden
is followed to its logical conclusion, the eleventh amendment will have
been relegated to the constitutional limbo already occupied by the
ninth and tenth amendments.
state which would be analogous to Alabama's operation of a railroad in interstate commerce and which therefore could be considered as entry into the congressionally regulated
area. The difficulty might not be insurmountable.
Suppose state agents are involved in a construction project requiring underwater
blasting. They construct a small portable dam to still the water in the blasting area. The
patentee of a similar dam sues for infringement. This was essentially the factual situation
of Cammayer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225 (1876). Since respondent superior applies, might not
the plaintiff argue that the state entered the regulated area by initiating the construction
project and thereby incurring potential liability for the infringements of its agents, just
as Alabama incurred potential liability by initiating the operation of the railroad. Given
the disfavor with which the Court views sovereign immunity, the Court might accept
the argument.
Suppose the state enters into an agreement with an independent contractor in which
the latter agrees to manufacture certain articles for the state. In the course of the
manufacture of the articles, a patent is infringed. Since "it is obvious that one may infringe a patent if he . . . [has] the offending articles manufactured for him by an
independent contractor," Crowell v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 143 F.2d 1003, 1004 (9th Cir.
1944), the plaintiff might claim that the making of the contract constituted "entry."
73 If the claimed immunity were viewed as constitutional, it could be argued that the
provision of a remedy for one whose patent was infringed is a valid regulatory purpose
which Congress can secure by waiver of constitutional rights upon entry by the state.
74 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).

